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I. A CONVERSATION LONG AGO WITH PROFESSOR GLENDON
Some twenty or so years ago, Mary Ann Glendon said something
to me in a conversation in her office at Harvard Law School.
There's no special reason why she would remember it or the con-
versation itself; I was a visiting professor that term, teaching in-
ternational human rights and the laws and ethics of war, and she
was suggesting that I needed to reach beyond public international
law into comparative law. This was a field about which I knew
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very little, and in explaining why I should find it important, she
said, "We see through our glass darkly, after all."
I was puzzled by her use of "our." Why "our" rather than the
usual scriptural "the" or "a" glass darkly? She explained, howev-
er, with reference to different societies and their different legal
systems-the very stuff of comparative law-that each sees
through its own glass and each sees in some way "darkly," peering
through the accreted overlays of its own customs, traditions, bu-
reaucratic and administrative processes, toward a moral and ra-
tional reading of that society's law. Every society's "glass" carries
with it obscuring layers, both moral and rational, and part of the
value of comparative law as a field of study is that it provides tools
for seeing and understanding those blinders-the motes in others'
eyes and the beams in one's own, if all goes well-in order to bring
light to the darkness.
We don't have unmediated access to any perfectly moral, per-
fectly rational, perfectly idealized or abstract legal form-even if,
in principle, there were such a thing. What we do have, however,
is the ability to compare ways of doing things in different societies
and their legal systems, in order to see through the exercise of
perspective, what might be a better (or sometimes worse) way of
doing things in our own legal system and society. But then Pro-
fessor Glendon added (I paraphrase the conversation from
memory), "I said 'ours' because it matters that it's 'ours.' There's
nothing wrong with preferring your own way of seeing through the
glass, just because it's yours-the product of your society, your
history, your attachments and affections and those of your people.
That's especially true of the founding texts of a political society
and law-a society's constitution."
I did not take up comparative law as a field of scholarship, but
some years later, I did take up a question deeply implicated here:
the question of the proper role, if any, of other legal systems and
societies and their law in interpreting one's own fundamental,
founding constitutional law. I took up that question because, in
the late 1990s up through the late 2000s, a distinct intellectual
climate had taken hold, particularly among influential academic
legal elites as well as some U.S. Supreme Court Justices, that for-
eign law ought to have a role to play-perhaps a significant one-
in the interpretation and adjudication of U.S. constitutional ques-
tions.
Beginning to write on this topic in the early and mid-2000s, this
conversation with Professor Glendon immediately came to my
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mind. It has had a framing influence on my views ever since.
There's no reason why Professor Glendon would recall this conver-
sation, and I certainly don't want to put onto her any of my views.
But despite my failure to become a "comparativist" in the legal
academy, and as with so many other things in my thinking in law
and ethics, Mary Ann Glendon has had a profound and salutary
influence on my work-on my work, but also (however improbable
those who know me might think this) on me as a reasoning, moral
person.
Comparative and international law, yes, international human
rights law, yes, just war and the ethics of war, yes. But also, I feel
personally compelled to add, a long list of other and deeper mat-
ters: my thinking about the religion in which I was raised but had
since departed, Mormonism, and its place in the world, by compar-
ison (that method of comparativism again) to the faith of my wife
and daughter, American Catholicism; the role and meaning of in-
tellectual elites within a faith-and-reason religious tradition;
communitarianism, civil society, private and public, and individu-
al rights and liberties; the place of love and the bonds of affection
in ethics and politics; and, finally, the Catholic insistence on the
irreducibly social as a category in law, morality, politics, and thus,
social theory.
I owe Professor Glendon a great personal and intellectual debt
stretching back over decades; this particular topic is among them.
In the remainder of this brief essay, however, I won't try to offer a
commentary as such on Professor Glendon's Duquesne lecture, but
instead will simply reflect on the proper role, in my view, of where
foreign law has a place in U.S. constitutional adjudication (and
where it doesn't), but, more especially, I will comment on the tra-
jectory that the "foreign law in U.S. constitutional adjudication"
has been on since the high water mark of that debate that oc-
curred somewhere around 2006.
II. COMPARATIVISM AS METHODOLOGICAL PERMISSIONS AND
LIMITATIONS: ACADEMIC LAW'S ANTHROPOLOGISTS
Implicit in Professor Glendon's remarks is a double message.
On the one hand, because any particular society and its legal sys-
tem, its substantive law as well as processes and institutions of
adjudication and interpretation of law, will necessarily be par-
tial-partial to itself, and the product of its own history-
comparativism counsels looking to other legal systems and socie-
ties in order to understand and, perhaps, amend one's own.
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Knowledge of what is done in other places, why it is done, and how
it is done provides a form of expertise that comparative law offers
to one's own legal system.
Comparativism does more than merely offer expertise, however;
on the other hand, it gives a normative reason to use it, at least to
consider how one's own society addresses certain legal questions
by comparison to other places. In this normative regard, at least
as compared to some idealized legal system, comparative law of-
fers comparisons in the real world. As an academic field, it makes
such knowledge available; as a normative proposition, it gives
permission to and affirms the positive value of knowing and con-
sidering how and why other places do things differently.
That's in the way of "permissions" offered by comparative law.
But, as Professor Glendon has pointed out many times in many
places, comparative law as an academic endeavor insists equally
upon "limitations" that derive from comparative law methodolo-
gies themselves. Judges, as Professor Glendon has eloquently
noted, are sometimes wont to cherry pick holdings, rulings, cases,
and decisional language that happen to support whatever sub-
stantive proposition the judge endorses in the case. Yet the meth-
odology of comparative law says that this is never a justifiable
way to proceed comparatively. Merely quoting substantive hold-
ings or language from cases fails to place them in the historically,
socially, politically, ethically, and legally special context in which
substance finally obtains. Only within that matrix can one
properly understand or interpret the substance; it scarcely if ever
substantively "speaks for itself."
Basic procedural functions do not necessarily translate accu-
rately across systems; for example, Spain's 'juez de instruccion"
does not have an easy legal homologue in the U.S. system. The
basic doctrines of legal authority, precedent, interpretation, and
even whether the language of a decision has a precedential role at
all in that legal system for future cases will all have potentially
large impacts on how and what a decision says; little if any of this
can be understood and taken into account merely by finding lan-
guage in a foreign case that appears to come from that legal sys-
tem's highest court. What constitutes the "highest court" can
mean different things in different legal systems, for that matter.
Those who don't live in federal systems often find surprising the
U.S. insistence that the federal courts cannot intervene in some
kinds of state cases, even in such controversial matters as the
death penalty or what, to the rest of the world, appear to be clear
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cases of federal sovereignty over states in matters mandated by
treaty (consular access for a criminal suspect, for example). But
Americans often find puzzling how to fit the special "constitutional
courts" of some legal systems into the hierarchical system of the
U.S. federal courts.
American-style judicial review? It's been adopted some places,
but puzzles many other people abroad. The U.S. Constitution's
religion clauses-as seen by those whose constitutions mandate a
serious, real commitment to a particular religion, such as juridi-
cally Islamic states? This leads to serious confusions. Many Is-
lamic states have ratified many human rights conventions dealing
with women's or children's rights, after all, but with the reserva-
tion that it is all subject to Shari'a law and its meanings. This
makes it easy to carp about the United States being the terrible
human rights outlier, one of a small number of states that has not
ratified the women's rights convention' or the children's rights
convention.2 But a micron or so below the surface of purely formal
treaty ratification numbers lies a quite different reality as to what
places and states are least respectful of the rights of women and
children or religious minorities. Moreover, the differences are not
merely between the judicial processes or constitutional doctrines
within the field of judicial activity; the role of the judiciary in a
constitutional order means very different things in a parliamen-
tary versus presidential system, a constitutional order with a de-
liberate separation of powers versus a constitutionally unitary
understanding of the state.
One could go on and on, but the point is two-fold. Compara-
tivism counsels permissions, and indeed, an obligation to look
comparatively in order to seek to see through the dark glass of
one's own system, views, and presuppositions. At the same time,
it counsels limitations, because undertaking this comparative
work requires deep knowledge of how anything apparently sub-
stantive is embedded in the dense web of its own system, history
and derivation. Comparativists, we might say, are the "anthro-
pologists" of academic law-and, in ways not entirely dissimilar to
the traditional methods of cultural anthropology, propositions of
apparently universal substance are hedged up and located deep
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx.
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/CRC.aspx.
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within local structures of knowledge and ways of establishing
knowledge. These must be excavated, framed, studied and exam-
ined within their contexts. Otherwise, the process of grabbing this
bit or that of some foreign legal system and proudly displaying it
as part of your legal system resembles less anthropology than In-
diana Jones-style grave robbing. Real anthropology is hard; like-
wise, the real work of comparative law is hard.
From that perspective, the obligation to undertake comparison
across systems will rarely yield "useable" propositions from the
standpoint of what American judges and courts do every day-
which is to say, rarely will American courts be able to use proposi-
tions from other systems to directly address particular cases in
our system. In some kinds of cases, however-those that are not
about a legal system's fundamental, constitutive documents, its
constitution-comparative work is necessary and unavoidable in
adjudication. Jurisdictions do touch each other; they interact,
and, as the proponents of robust global governance never tire of
saying, a globalized economy makes this increasingly true.
Everyone from Justice Stephen Breyer to Justice Antonin Scalia
agrees, for example, that judges must consult foreign law in many
cases involving the meanings in domestic law giving effect.to trea-
ty provisions or adjudication in domestic law that a treaty regime
might mandate shall be undertaken by the domestic courts of all
states party to the treaty. Indeed, in some instances, the treaty at
issue, as embraced by the political branches in ratifying it, calls
upon judges to seek convergence with other states' courts in its
interpretation. The Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(CISG), for example, contemplates that the commercial courts of
all states-party to the treaty shall hear cases arising in their ju-
risdiction under the CISG and adjudicate them within the mean-
ing and intent of the treaty and informed by the decisions of other
tribunals in the world doing the same.
Yet these necessary points of contact between legal systems, re-
quiring rules for determining jurisdiction and venue in an increas-
ingly interconnected world, as well as substantive law on many
things, are still different from the constitutive, constitutional doc-
uments of a polity and its legal system. These constitutive mat-
ters touch on the disciplines of "anthropology" and "intellectual
history" that are so much a part of comparative law methodology.
But they provide profoundly cautionary arguments, much of the
time, for why there is so little that can be drawn by judicial action
on its own from one legal system into another at the level of genu-
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inely constitutive law. Constitutive legal documents-a system's
constitution-have meaning only within the webs of legally formal
and socially informal understandings and commitments that give
those documents legitimacy.
Comparative constitutionalism in considerable part teaches, in
other words, that knowledge of a society's constitutive legal docu-
ments includes the knowledge of just how embedded they are in
thick social relations of all kinds. The implication is that, as a
matter of descriptive fact, what one might want substantively to
take from one legal system into another at the level of constitu-
tionalism and constitutional interpretation necessarily takes with
it large parts of the documents' background, history, and informal
social understandings-because they are part of what it is, part of
what constitutes the social and political order codified in, or, more
precisely, coded into-a constitution. Those social relationships
are not merely interesting background and history that are useful
in interpretation.
This is not to say that some legal systems are not sufficiently
close in common culture and history, shared political experience,
and shared social relationships, that they cannot inform each oth-
er. Jurisprudence among states that inherit the common law or
the civil law traditions sometimes share enough that this process
can carry its own legitimacy: Australia and Britain, for example.
But this can only get one so far, because the intellectual work of
cross-fertilization between states and their legal systems is done,
not by reference to some universal rule of law that is supposed to
undergird all (genuine law-driven) legal systems, but instead by
highly particularized commonalities of history, culture, and socie-
ty that operate in the background.
Conflating one with the other is intellectually fatal. In this re-
gard, one sorrows to recall that the eminent legal and moral phi-
losopher Jeremy Waldron, at the height of the great debate of the
mid-2000s over this "comparative constitutionalism," wrote a
short and elegantly argued book in favor of a great deal of com-
parative constitutional embrace.3 Although the argument was
subtle and more persuasive than I suggest here, the cases cited,
alas, were largely so much those of developed Anglo-common law
states that they could prove only the unremarkable proposition
that New Zealand and Canada could indeed share constitutional
3. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND: FOREIGN
LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS (2012).
Winter 2014 121
Duquesne Law Review
jurisprudence-as they not so long ago once shared a Queen,
which is to say, shared a constitutional order.
The United States and, say, Zimbabwe, China, Saudi Arabia, or
Bhutan, by contrast? Were we to take the methods of academic
comparative law seriously, they would force to the fore a great
many questions that cases shared by New Zealand, Canada, and
the United Kingdom could not answer.
III. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS THE U.S. CONSTITUTION'S SOURCE
OF LEGITIMACY
Academic comparative constitutional law teaches us both the
necessity of comparative understandings, but also just how limited
the available scope to use that knowledge is in actual constitu-
tional adjudication, in actual American constitutional cases, where
the U.S. Constitution carries its own history and source of legiti-
macy. That history and source of legitimacy impose their own lim-
its on how much U.S. adjudicators are able to engage in constitu-
tional comparativism as a basis for decision--or even as a citable
source with some analytic purchase or relevance to U.S. constitu-
tional adjudication. This point has been made extensively in the
academic literature and, not insignificantly, in judicial opinions
(particularly those of Justice Scalia) calling out the use of foreign
law in U.S. constitutional adjudication.'
The point, in sum, is that the particular constitutional tradition
that gives rise to the U.S. constitution is popular sovereignty. The
people are sovereign. Popular sovereignty as a basis for constitu-
tional legitimacy might be normatively a bad theory, incoherent,
or just morally wrong, of course. But it is hard to get around the
descriptive fact of its centrality, particularly given that some ver-
sion of it underlies most of the differences between the United
States and many other states that otherwise share our commit-
ment to liberal, rights-protective democracy and the rule of law.
The post-war constitutions of Western Europe, for example, make
4. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we
are expounding. The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be
relevant.. . . But where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the
views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to
be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant [to the Court's decision
interpreting the Eighth Amendment] are the practices of the 'world community,' whose
notions ofjustice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.").
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treaties, as international law, pari passu if not superior to existing
constitutional law; cannot fathom a "last in time" rule as between
a treaty and a later domestic statute; find inconceivable a federal-
ism that kicks the federal government out of state law conflicting
with an apparent treaty obligation or its judicial interpretation;
and so on. They are liberal democracies and the United States is a
liberal democracy, but their histories lead them to constitutive
incompatibility with the U.S. on exactly this point. The U.S. Con-
stitution calls international law part of "our" law (as American
international law academics never tire of saying, as though it were
a union card), but it simply means something altogether different
in U.S. law by comparison to what it would mean in many other
countries. Yale constitutional law scholar Jed Rubenfeld-no con-
servative, he-put the descriptive point definitively, by compari-
son to the European tradition:
It's essential here to distinguish between two conceptions of
constitutionalism. The first views the fundamental tenets of
constitutional law as expressing universal, liberal, Enlight-
enment principles, whose authority is superior to that of all
national politics, including national democratic politics. This
universal authority, residing in a normative domain above
politics and nation-states, is what allows constitutional law,
interpreted by unelected judges, to countermand all govern-
mental actions, including laws enacted by democratically
elected legislators. From this perspective, it's reasonable for
international organizations and courts to frame constitutions,
establish international human-rights laws, interpret these
constitutions and laws, and, in general, create a system of in-
ternational law to govern nation-states. I call this view "in-
ternational constitutionalism."
The alternative to international constitutionalism is Ameri-
can, or democratic, national constitutionalism. It holds that a
nation's constitution ought to be made through that nation's
democratic process, because the business of the constitution is
to express the polity's most basic legal and political commit-
ments. These commitments will include fundamental rights
that majorities are not free to violate, but the countermajori-
tarian rights are not therefore counter democratic. Rather,
they are democratic because they represent the nation's self-
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given law, enacted through a democratic constitutional poli-
tics. Over time, from this perspective, constitutional law is
supposed to evolve and grow in a fashion that continues to
express national interpretations and reinterpretations of the
polity's fundamental commitments.
In American constitutionalism, the work of democratically
drafting and ratifying a constitution is only the beginning.
Just as important, if not more so, is the question of who inter-
prets the constitution. In the American view, constitutional
law must somehow remain the nation's self-given law, even as
it is reworked through judicial interpretation and reinterpreta-
tion, and this requires interpretation by national courts. By
contrast, in international constitutionalism, interpretation by
a body of international jurists is, in principle, not only satis-
factory but superior to local interpretation, which invariably
involves constitutional law in partisan and ideological politi-
cal disputes.'
One understands why the Europeans, or at least their academic
elites, find this so troubling. Their own history tells them that
this is a recipe for the world's worst wars, plain and simple. The
experiences of those wars, in turn, have wired into their hearts
and minds that a constitution must be a top-down affair; it is not
something to be left to the people. It is the distinction-a part of
practical political theory since the French Revolution at least-
between the general and the popular will. They are likely always
to embrace the enlightened general will over the un-wisdom of the
"people." But by the same token, popular sovereignty is wired into
the hearts and minds of Americans as the source of constitutional
legitimacy.
True, it has always been less so among American elites, which
often incline to see the risks of "populism"- which they conflate
sometimes too quickly with popular sovereignty. But Lincoln, one
could argue, was no populist, and saw popular sovereignty as the
constitutional ability of the people to choose their leaders wisely in
a genuinely republican form of government. Elites today arguably
prefer a diminution of popular sovereignty in favor of the rule of
experts-today's expert elites, for example, whose claim legiti-
mately to rule (and the distinction from "governance" here would
5. Jeb Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003,
http://www.wilsonquarterly.comlessays/two-world-orders (emphasis added).
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be an instructive digression) rests mostly upon their claims to ex-
pertise and technocratic skills. Not all American elites are im-
pressed by this, to be sure. Professor Glendon is among those who
pointed out (decades ago in her book Rights Talk') that a republic
based around popular sovereignty requires a reasonable level of
civic virtue-a people whose liberty is secured by their own self-
discipline. Technocratic elite rule, that is, rule by experts, cannot
substitute for a minimum level of enlightened self-restraint among
the citizenry if it is to keep its republic.
One can debate nearly endlessly whether top-down universalist
constitutionalism or popular sovereignty is the better way. But if
one holds popular sovereignty as one's vision and source of fun-
damental legitimacy, then it is simply a practical fact that draw-
ing in comparative constitutionalism from constitutional systems
grounded in very different conceptions of legitimacy will be more
difficult, even in principle, than it otherwise would be-and if one
is faithful to a thick-description method of comparativism, per-
haps impossible. It's difficult because it becomes hard to answer
Judge Posner's quip, made back in the midst of this grand debate,
rejecting foreign law in constitutional adjudication: "No thanks,
we already have our own laws."'
IV. JUDGES IN THE NEW GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER
The reason a public intellectual and prominent judge such as
Richard Posner would offer such a remark at all is the rise and
(mostly) fall of certain ideas at the heart of judging. They are the
source of a judge's legitimacy: the role of national judiciaries and
especially supreme constitutional courts in the processes of global-
ization; and the mechanisms of global governance that played
themselves out from roughly the early 1990s to the late 2000s, but
have since faltered in the U.S., if not necessarily elsewhere. The
idea (in Tweet form) is that national judiciaries should see them-
selves, at least in part, as an elite global fraternity whose con-
frbres (within, to be sure, the range of discretion that legal sys-
tems regard as a necessary feature of judging, and especially with-
in the rhetorical and justificatory discretion permitted judges ac-
6. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1993).
7. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws,
LEGAL AFF. (July/Aug. 2004), http://legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-
2004/feature-posnerjulaug4.msp.
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cording to the terms of their particular legal systems) should
strive to promote harmonization across constitutional systems, in
the service of global governance. Judges, though legally creatures
of their national political orders, should be socialized toward a
globalized, universal-minded cosmopolitanism, so to help midwife
the institutions of global governance of the future.
There was never anything untoward or unseemly about this,
let's be clear. Part of what judges do in any system not run by ro-
bots is exercise discretion, including discretion in how to frame,
declare, and justify their actions. Even in judicial systems where
judges are far more hedged up in what they can do and how they
can explain it than American judges (not many legal systems, it
can safely be said, would be able to accommodate the frankly glo-
rious tradition of a Judge Richard Posner or Judge Stephen Rein-
hardt or Judge Jack Weinstein), some discretion is still part of
judging and there is room in many instances to reach to one kind
ofjustificatory or explanatory material over another.
What was urged during this period was that judges across the
globe should view themselves as part of a loose, but nonetheless
real, global network, fraternity, consortium or what have you ex-
tending horizontally across the world's legal systems. Judges
should embrace this judicial cosmopolitanism within the permissi-
ble national limits of their regulatory roles-regulating constitu-
tional law and, in turn, its regulation of a nation's relationship to
the international community as a community of governance. But
this embrace is a matter of the psychological and social orientation
of judges, motivated in no small part by the desire to have the re-
spect of one's judicial peers, who increasingly will be understood
by judges themselves to be other judges across the world also in
this peer network. The dynamic that Anne-Marie Slaughter, in
particular, urged in A New World Order' is not a legal mandate as
such, and she is careful to emphasize that it has to remain cabined
within the limits of judicial discretion as a matter of national law.
Nonetheless, it encourages the socialization of judges into a global
network that might most accurately be called seeking a global ju-
dicial peerage.
The effect, then, is to transform an argument about what it
means to be a judge in a national legal system into a strategy for
promoting a sensibility-promoting a psychological and social
sense of judicial self that prizes elite judicial cosmopolitanism. It
8. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005).
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is psychological because it consists of individually internalized
attitudes about ideals of judging; it is social, however, because it
promotes actions by judges to internalize those attitudes them-
selves, and then impart them to other judges as a process of peer
group socialization. One way to do this is through sharing and
approving judicial acts in favor of some particular global jurispru-
dence by members of the network. Judges are not paid in material
wealth, after all, and psychological compensation in the form of
prestige, respect, and so on is important. Judges ought to be in-
culcated, therefore, to look to the respect and approval of judges of
other states and international tribunals, and from the interna-
tional community's self-appointed moralistes, the international
human rights NGOs. This sensibility would provide an important
bulwark in the framework of legitimacy by which aspects of state
sovereignty could be transferred over time to mechanisms of glob-
al governance.
Put in these very simple, abbreviated terms, it is hard not to
make this out to sound shady, illegitimate, or conspiratorial, the
stuff of 1950s Cold War science fiction novels about the subtle
wiles of propaganda. I don't mean anything like that. It's a story
about a battle of ideas about governance, globalization, and sover-
eignty after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold
War. Those events unleashed a period of remarkably unbridled
optimism among various global elites for the emergence of forms
of global governance that would defang sovereignty and pick up
the task of constructing a liberal international order of governance
that was the original conception of it by the Americans in 1945,
put on hold by the Cold War.
In that case, "defanging sovereignty" meant the rise of liberal
internationalism as global governance, usefully defined by Francis
Fukuyama as a belief in international law and institutions over-
coming the anarchic power relations of sovereign states.' Yet de-
spite liberal internationalism's impeccable American pedigree,
dating back to 1945 and the founding of the UN, this would also
necessarily mean dismantling sovereignty, at least in the meaning
9. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER , AND THE
NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY 7 (2007); see also Kenneth Anderson, Goodbye to All That? A
Requiem for Neoconservatism, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 277 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=973883.
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that Abraham Lincoln famously gave it: a "political community,
without a political superior."o
Learned and eminent scholars-Anne-Marie Slaughter, as al-
ready noted, for example, in her A New World Order, Abram
Chayes, and Antonia Chayes, or renowned political scientist Rob-
ert Keohane-debated whether the rise of liberal internationalism
as global governance meant the loss of sovereignty or merely its
transformation. And even if I was having none of it, many of the
finest minds in the legal academy, in Europe and elsewhere, in-
vested considerable energies in theories of post-sovereign global
governance, and equally in the paths that might lead the world
there. So, for example, should "global government" prove too diffi-
cult, we could retreat to "global governance"-governance without
government. Or we could scratch expressly political theory, jetti-
son (at least on the surface) the commitment to one substantive
political view over another, and simply aim for a world efficiently
run by its necessary bureaucracies; legitimacy would be reduced to
technocracy, and legitimate governance would be redefined as that
which makes the Internet run on time. Others (in Europe, espe-
cially) devoted themselves to celebrating the emerging constitu-
tional theory of the European Union-the "post-sovereign" consti-
tutional order par excellence-and elaborating ways in which the
constitutional model of the EU could be scaled up to the whole
globe, the "global constitutionalism" movement.
Still others decided not to announce a path, but simply to con-
template changes since 1990 and discern in them self-organizing
global governance-whatever actually happened somehow could
always be seen as leading to political shifts in the world toward
the dismantling of the anarchic relations of sovereign states. Oth-
ers looked for causal material and economic drivers of political
global governance-as the world globalized economically, the
pressures of a global economy would drive forward political global
governance in order to overcome the economic limitations imposed
by a politically fragmented world and squeeze out the unneeded
political entities known as "sovereign states" as merely rent-
seeking sovereign transaction costs on the global economy. Sover-
eignty, then, would be nothing gloriously political, but merely a
monopolistic, hold-up, rent-seeking charge on global economic
transactions. Still others believed in a psychological shift in the
10. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), available
at http//www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/18611incoln-special.asp.
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hearts and minds of ordinary people, enabled by communications
technology to make people and events around the globe effectively
immediate to them, thus permitting the emergence of a cosmopoli-
tanism that would underpin shifts away from sovereignty and to-
ward a unified global order.
There were always skeptical voices, of course, but they custom-
arily came from the ranks of "hard" international relations real-
ists; their skepticism was directed toward whether the world could
arrive at the dreams and visions of the global governance ideal-
ists. It was not about the content of the vision as such - not about
the desirability of the vision. They were skeptics, not dissenters.
Genuine dissenters from the normative vision (who might or
might not also be skeptics about whether it was coming to pass)
were far fewer in the precincts of elites, academics and policy folk,
who paid attention to this stuff. I count myself as one, since the
1990s-normative dissenter and factual skeptic.
But Professor Glendon, too, in her always measured way, drew
upon her work on human rights and its history as an idea in 1945
to urge that those announcing radically different orders of power
and authority in the world might reflect carefully on the moral
risks of disconnecting universal human rights from the authority
of democratic sovereign states. I myself have been less measured,
remarking that human rights universalists should be very, very
careful what they wish for in the way of retreating sovereignty.
The moral universalism that the human rights community has
imagined for itself, since the 1990s to today, might be universal in
its self-conception, but in practical fact it has always dwelled un-
der the sheltering sky of a specifically American hegemony."
V. COSMOPOLITANISM AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
This was life among the intellectuals and academics. But judg-
es can be intellectuals, too, sometimes academics as well, and dur-
ing this same time period, several Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court began to explore-in a tentative way, in bits and pieces of
judicial decisions as well as other venues-the legitimacy of em-
bracing global governance and what that might mean for a na-
tional judiciary. It was premised upon the prevailing ethos of
globalization, economic drivers of globalization that, in the form of
11. See KENNETH ANDERSON, LIVING WITH THE UN: AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 268 (2012).
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international commercial and trade disputes, make up significant
parts of the judiciary's daily work.
"Cosmopolitanism" as used here is not intended to be a theoreti-
cally deep idea. All that's meant is a way of looking at the world
and acting toward it, by reference to the whole and not a single,
narrow part of it; seeking not precisely abstract universalism, but
principles for dealing with the world that nonetheless prioritize
interconnections across it; identifying with impartiality over par-
tiality, engagement with many parts of the world while retaining
a slightly distanced, toward engagement with any particular part
of it; the universal over the particular or the merely parochial.
A full account of cosmopolitanism at the U.S. Supreme Court,
however, might also distinguish between two varieties as ex-
pressed in constitutional law: one that we might call "rationalist
cosmopolitanism," associated with Justice Breyer, and the other
"affective cosmopolitanism," associated with Justice Kennedy.
Under the "rationalist" approach, references to constitutional
courts of other states simply continue, as a matter of degree rather
than kind, the way in which courts take each other and their ju-
risprudence into account in a world of increasingly dense econom-
ic, but also social, cultural, technological, and every other form of
globalization. In this rationalist account, canvassing the positions
of the courts of other nations considering similar problems might
"cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions
to a common legal problem," as he put it in his dissent in Printz v.
United States.12
Critics like myself have raised any number of objections with
this seemingly rational interest in learning about how other juris-
dictions handle a common problem that is then expressed as a ci-
tation in an opinion on U.S. constitutional law. Many of the objec-
tions are implied by the aforementioned difficulties of comparison
in comparative law. For that matter, if the point about globaliza-
tion is about "common" problems, then a question regarding the
application of the death penalty in the United States is not a
"common" question, it's merely a "parallel" one. Absent special
facts in which other jurisdictions are involved (such as execution
of another state's national with claims of lack of consular access),
"common" problems are those in which the answer given by one
nation's courts might have cross-border effects on another state or
its court system, raising a more-than-academic interest in at least
12. 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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considering coordination. The most important situations of such
"common" legal problems are commercial or trade issues that
might have consequences for the U.S. or for some other sovereign
in international economic relations, and they are not ordinarily
constitutional problems. And yet, as the example of Printz v.
United States demonstrates, leading foreign law citations in U.S.
constitutional cases are not about "common" problems in that
sense, but instead a rhetorical invitation to see the superiority of
another jurisdiction's answer to an arguably similar issue, almost
always about core issues of values-the death penalty, for exam-
ple.
Cool rationalism, particularly the anodyne suggestion that this
is mere "empiricism," somehow doesn't seem quite right when the
actual cases are those that implicate deep values. What is really
at issue, it would seem, is whether constitutional law is supposed
to instantiate not the values as expressed through the political
processes of popular sovereignty within a sovereign political com-
munity, but instead to channel the universal values of global hu-
man rights, in which the role of the Supreme Court Justice's role
in constitutional matters takes on the sense of bringing the uni-
versal light of human rights-as found in foreign and internation-
al tribunals-to the less than enlightened people of the United
States and their political representatives. It is easier to see this,
however, by looking past the cool rationalism of Justice Breyer to
the nakedly transcendental jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy.
Justice Kennedy's leading citation to foreign and non-U.S.-
accepted international law, as far as this argument over universal-
ism goes, is found in Roper v. Simmons," a 2005 Supreme Court
case holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed by those under the age of eighteen. Justice
Kennedy's opinion was remarkable because it specifically consid-
ered a treaty-the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child-to
which the U.S. has considered becoming a party, but has not done
so.14 For many critics, myself included, this amounted to looking
to a constitutional human rights ether dwelling somewhere above
in the heavens and discerning in it moral propositions that must
be embraced as law. Cosmopolitan, yes, but not in the coolly ra-
tionalist fashion of Justice Breyer-less rationality than soothsay-
ing, a deeply emotional connection to notions of human rights
13. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
14. Id. at 622.
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whose actual status in American law turned out to be curiously
irrelevant.
VI. WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CREATING A "GLOBAL LEGAL
SYSTEM" THROUGH GLOBAL NETWORKS OF JUDGES?
But that's cosmopolitanism at the level of citations to the law it-
self. The more fundamental question, in order to understand the
high water mark for such embrace in constitutional law, is to what
extent the Justices at the time accepted the arguments made,
most notably by Anne-Marie Slaughter, in favor of a sort of global
elite of judges, looking horizontally to each other to create what
she called a "global legal system."'" A benign extension, with some
modest accommodations to other legal systems, of essentially
American constitutional values? In Slaughter's formulation, it is
benign only if one does not especially value the robustness of the
First Amendment, or any number of different American practices
in civil libertiesi-a prominent function of the global networks of
judges would be to create distinctly social pressures on American
judges to see themselves and American standards on such things
as free speech as global outliers.
The general idea (popular with some legal academics, human
rights activists, and others of the international community equally
eager to shut down Rwandan radio stations making an entirely
serious call to genocide, and also shut up, say, conservative com-
mentator Mark Steyn) was that American judges needed to be
shorn of their historical sense that truly robust free speech was
something honorable and the sacred obligation of an independent
judiciary to defend against a government or a mob eager to shut
down dissenting speech. American judges needed to be socialized
into a different sort of society-an international one of fellow
judges, whose good opinion would come to matter to them, and
who would gradually cause them to feel (not just understand, but
genuinely feel) that America's commitment to free speech was,
effectively, yet another American vulgarity, and that in any case,
it set a bad example in a world in which American arguments for
robust free speech were really just permission to incite genuine
mass slaughter.
15. SLAUGHTER, supra note 8, at 65.
16. Id.
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This amounts to a sort of shame-and-blame campaign-the
standard playbook of human rights NGOs-to embarrass Ameri-
can judges into a sort of generalized embarrassment over the puri-
ty of American First Amendment jurisprudence, and to see the
need to embrace the sort of "hate speech" limitations embraced by
the countries of Europe or Canada. As a campaign, it is intended
as a means to push U.S. constitutionalism back to the supposed
global center occupied by those possessed of the better angels of
universal values. But in order to have traction, such a reshaping
requires a particular social context that invites such affect and
emotion. Slaughter argued that the proper context was a global
network of judges who, although "vertically" appointed by and ac-
countable to their national authorities, would be shaped in their
judicial character, so to speak, by this horizontal society"- a real
society that would produce a genuinely global social orientation
among judges and that would express itself in the underlying
background assumptions that shape the discretionary and rhetori-
cal practices that necessarily infuse judging.
This sounds conspiratorial; it is not and was not intended that
way. It merely drew upon the fact that judges necessarily operate
against a largely unstated set of background assumptions and
world-view; it is perfectly legitimate to suggest that the sensibility
of the attentive judge ought to be shaped and educated with par-
ticular values in mind. In a globalizing world, in which constitu-
tions do not merely encode values, but human rights-the global
mother of all other proper and universal values, on a certain way
of seeing things-it's perfectly legitimate to say that judges ought
to be inculcated with a culture of global norms and look for their
social approval not parochially to their own society, but to that of
the more universal, more impartial and, hence, more moral rest of
the world. No more judging merely through our glass, darkly.
Back in the early 2000s when it was first published, Chapter 2
of Slaughter's A New World Order offered an elegant vision of
judges being shaped by global networks of other judges" in order
to help bring about a convergence of values at a global level, in
light of international human rights and, seemingly, anything but
the mechanisms of a sovereign people. Today, a decade later, in
the resurgence of sovereignty, this seems almost an alternative
universe, a fantasy-but in its moment, it was elegant and spoke
17. Id.
18. Id.
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to the sense of many global intellectuals that there was a genuine
pathway forward.
Did Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court of the time lean toward
it in any serious way? There were a handful of citations in cases.
There were a handful of speeches that excited many. In retro-
spect, we academics seem to have over-read the commitment be-
hind an address by a Supreme Court Justice to the American So-
ciety of International Law annual meeting: one says many flatter-
ing things about comparative and international law in such
speeches, but in practice one does not quite mean them.'9 The
most important statement on the subject turned out to be the pub-
lic discussion of the use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional adju-
dication offered by Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia in 2005 at
American University Law School.20
In the American University discussion, Justice Breyer was cau-
tious about embracing anything close to the "networks of judges"
view, let alone the emergence of the "global legal system" that
Slaughter pressed in A New World Order. On the contrary, he
embraced notably modest grounds for such citation-merely em-
pirical expertise gleaned from how other judiciaries address cer-
tain similar problems, combined with an observation that such
citation is not that big a deal. It's not claimed as controlling prec-
edent, or anything much like "precedent" or "legal authority. "21
It's not so different from a judge citing a line from Shakespeare.
Justice Breyer added (I paraphrase) that of course judges read
all sorts of things, and if a judge reads opinions from other juris-
dictions and draws insight from them, surely the judge ought to
acknowledge them.2 2 We can gloss that to say that it's not as if
judges are special ascetics, isolated in monastic chambers in order
19. The speech was by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg from the 2005 American Society of
International Law (ASIL) Annual Meeting. See Anne E. Kornblut, Justice Ginsburg Backs
Value of Foreign Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/02/politics/02ginsburg.htm1.
20. Washington College of Law, "A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for
American Constitutional Adjudication with U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia &
Stephen Breyer," (Jan. 13, 2005), transcript available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm.
21. Justice Breyer, at one point in the discussion, stated: "[F]irst, of course, foreign law
doesn't bind us, constitutional law. Of course not. But these are human beings, more and
more, called judges, who are human beings despite concern about that matter -- (laughter) -
- human beings, called judges, who have problems that often, more and more, are similar to
our own." Id.
22. Justice Breyer stated: "If here I have a human being called a judge in a different
country dealing with a similar problem, why don't I read what he says if it's similar
enough?" Id.
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to ensure that, when they come to judge, they have had no contact
with anything other than the "law" or the briefs of the parties.
And of course we would not want them to be that; the life of the
law, at least American law, is experience of the world as lived, and
we want our judges alive to the currents of our times, while still
being able to separate themselves from the currents of society in
order to be able to judge cases impartially.
The problem in part, however, is that A New World Order of-
fered an elegant and convincing explanation of how the gradual
accumulation of apparently authority-less citations by American
judges to foreign cases in constitutional adjudication could even-
tually build a tower of authority that would move from mere
adornment to "persuasive" authority. It might or might not ever
formally be denominated "controlling" authority-triumph for lib-
eral internationalist global governance though that would be-
because persuasive authority will often be sufficient. Although it's
not difficult to construct a path by which Justice Breyer's rational-
ism could make these moves, it is much plainer in the gradual, but
actual slide down this slope represented by Justice Kennedy. The
slide is easier to see, in part, because Justice Kennedy's cosmopoli-
tan commitments are rooted less in coolly instrumental rationality
than in "affective" attachments to certain values. It's an emotion-
al attachment to deeply felt values about human rights, about
their universal appeal and propagation, as well as an unabashed
desire to use the tools of law to bend the arc of history to the good.
Which is to say, it wears its constitutional heart on its sleeve.
The legitimacy, then, that Justice Kennedy seems to view as in-
herent in these judicial acts appears to derive from a deeply felt
sense of their universality. Universality matters because, if these
values (inevitably expressed as judicially enforceable rights) are
universal, then the fact that they don't have authority in our law
is neither here nor there; it describes a defect of our law and its
failure to properly value universal justice. Given, however, that
as mere human beings we don't have direct access to the com-
mands of universal justice, the next-best test of universality lies in
the approval of other legal systems and other judges, the overlap-
ping consensus of the embryonic global network of judges.
This is not a crazy theory of constitutional adjudication in val-
ues-laden cases-even if the natural law theory that it implicitly
relies upon is quite out of fashion and simply unworkable in a plu-
ralistic society insofar as it is supposed to drive down from broad
moral principles to settle particular instances and cases. But its
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reliance upon the opinions of others in a global peer community
for confirmation of universal values that ought to be made, even
imposed, as our values, turns a method of nearly transcendental
discernment of natural law into a process of seeking social, peer
group approval as a way of confirming moral approval. Consid-
ered as social practice, in the sense that Slaughter describes as
the socialization of judges to a global outlook, it looks an awful lot
like the craving for social approval-and social approval, moreo-
ver, from everyone who would otherwise not be relevant. Journal-
ists and other observers of the U.S. Supreme Court of the period
under discussion here made note-a New Yorker profile by Jeffrey
Toobin leading the way 23-of Justice Kennedy's engagement with
such international networks, and offered a variety of essentially
psychological explanations of it. Some of them were crudely pat-
ronizing-a need for approval by a provincial lawyer who still suf-
fered from social insecurities, quite the opposite of the born-to-
cosmopolitanism Justice Breyer, being the accompanying thought,
expressed openly or not.
The armchair psychologizing is unworthy, in my view, and its
underlying social arrogance causes it to miss the core point. Jus-
tice Kennedy's philosophy of judging has seemed to many smart
lawyers and legal academics to be intellectually second-rate, vacu-
ous, expansive but empty, rhetoric rather than reason-yet there
is, in my view, a role in constitutional judgment for something
that is not about syllogism. Justice Kennedy's constitutional
method, at least in regard to the use of foreign or international
law sources, is rooted in a worldview of universal values and a
core belief that these values are not so much "derived" as "apper-
ceived." This is usually expressed by saying that Justice Kennedy
embraces the "natural law" tradition, but I think the aspects of
discernment and apperception are his defining characteristics, for
present purposes. In my view, this more than anything else ac-
counts for Justice Kennedy's otherwise quite bizarre citation to a
treaty that the United States has quite consciously declined to
ratify and an article of which addressed exactly the issue in the
case, Roper v. Simmons. Shocking and wrong, yes, bizarre, no.
But if this is true of Justice Kennedy's constitutional methodol-
ogy, there is a critique with much stronger bite. While this kind of
apperceptive, discerning constitutional philosophy is a long and
23. Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law: Swing Shift, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/09/12/050912fa-fact.
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valued part of the American constitutional tradition, the apper-
ception of these values customarily has been by reference (even if
only tacitly) to America: to Americans, we the sovereign people,
our values, the better angels of who we are. In that regard, even
the appeal to universal values is still an appeal to us and to our
judgment, and so, even if imposed by the Court, it is nonetheless
an imposition in the form of an invitation to our better natures.
When the appeal to universality is said to receive its greatest con-
firmation precisely because it is by reference to everyone but us,
its imposition is just that, an imposition lacking in legitimacy.
Our law has moral lacunae, sure, and there is a time-honored,
though limited, legitimate appeal to morality to respond to them-
but the legitimacy therein is not by reference to the universal, but
to us. It's not by using the "universe" of "universal materials" to
apperceive "universal values," and still less so measured by the
"international." There's no reason to believe that the "interna-
tional"-as expressed by any supposed consensus of foreign law or
international law not assented to by the United States-is identi-
cal to the "universal." "International" and "global" are not the
same as "universal."
The legitimacy of "apperceiving" moral values and giving them
nearly unmediated application in constitutional law (at least in
the constitutional cases where they cannot be legitimated by ap-
plication of direct syllogisms of the law itself) lies in its appeal to
our values. It is not Justice Kennedy's affective constitutional
method that creates this particular problem; it is, rather, that he
invests his affections in universal values (in the admittedly small
set of cases in which foreign or un-assented international law is at
issue) that are then tested by reference to the planetary whole
rather than the American community. That would seem to create
a legitimacy problem for a system premised on popular sovereign-
ty. But we must also acknowledge that there is a reply to this: the
universal values drawn from the international community are also
American values. There is no genuine gap between them. They
are just, in a word, universal human rights. Since when are
Americans against universal human rights?
Well, of course Americans think that human rights are real and
important and universal. But we also think it perfectly acceptable
for their meaning and content to be determined for us-for this
political community, through the processes of popular sovereignty
and the American Constitution. This is not moral relativism,
though it is often mistaken for it: the objection is not from relativ-
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ism but from skepticism. The quarrel is not with the objective
existence of certain universal rights and values (though their con-
tent might be disputed in any given case); the quarrel is with who
is entitled authoritatively to pronounce them and through what
process. The international community (and arguably both Justice
Kennedy and Justice Breyer, in this period of their jurisprudence)
makes an assumption that has long received little skeptical atten-
tion. It is to assume that the "universal" and the "international"
or "global" are the same thing, so that merely national constitu-
tional processes for determining the content of universal rights
and values must necessarily be "partial" and inferior to the sup-
posedly universal, and therefore "impartial," processes of the in-
ternational community.
But this identity is suspect. Global does not mean universal; it
merely means not attached to particular geographies. The "inter-
ests" and "partialities" of the international community might not
be attached to a particular chunk of territory-but is merely the
partiality of those who are rootless and geographically detached,
elites who live in the jet stream between New York and Geneva,
the "interests" and "partialities" of those who do not have a terri-
torial geography. Why should anyone accept that these people
have any special moral authority to instruct everyone else on the
content of universal values? Why shouldn't the U.S. constitutional
system, which has, after all, been doing this for a long time, be
thought by its own people to have at least as good a claim on ar-
ticulating the "universal"?
In other words, it's not merely by reason of American parochial-
ism or small-minded nationalism that, during this period, judicial
confirmation hearings in Congress began to take sharply critical
account of what appeared to be a growing affection for "universal"
values, as defined by the "international community." It is not im-
proper for senators to inquire as to the sources of law that a nomi-
nee to judicial office regards as legitimate authority and in what
ways; the question that goes to the heart of what a nominee re-
gards as the ground of the Constitution's legitimacy. The answers
signal important commitments under the Constitution. There is
nothing dishonorable, of course, in affirming the "global" as the
"universal" to which one is committed as the ultimate source of
authority. But it is also not easily reconciled with being a Su-
preme Court Justice in a system committed to we the people as
sovereign.
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VII. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN RETREAT FROM UNIVERSALISM
To EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
That was then. It was a moment in constitutional time lasting
perhaps fifteen or twenty years, from around 1990 until the late
2000s. Although for convenience this essay has frequently used
the present tense to refer to this period, in fact, it is largely in the
past. The period of time in which one could talk of a "global legal
system" and global judicial networks and convergence around
norms by national judges is, on a genuinely global scale, done and
over. With it largely, too, the flirtation by some Supreme Court
Justices in those years with citation to foreign courts in constitu-
tional adjudication. Never say never, of course, but it does seem
likely that future citations will seem more like one-off oddities.
They will be isolated and unmoored, lacking an intellectual appa-
ratus standing ready to sustain them and grounded in some larger
ideological agenda of the kind that A New World Order was ready
to offer the judges of the world a dozen years ago.
What happened? After all, this process still moves forward
within Europe, and not just among international law academics,
who continue to produce volumes on global constitutionalism and
the ways it is supposedly happening and how it is supposed to
move forward. Among jurists in the EU, one could debate at
length to what extent judicial discourse has changed, if at all, but
in order to make relevant comparisons to the U.S. Supreme Court,
one would have to carefully explore the systemic similarities and
differences. A good place to start would be the decisions of Ger-
many's constitutional court in recent years addressing actions of
the European Central Bank responding to the euro crisis of the
past five years and whether they violate inviolable terms of the
German constitution. German nationalism-national judicial nos-
talgia for the discipline of the Deutschmark and the Bundesbank?
Or the German constitutional court acting in accordance with
German constitutional law-but, in the very same judicial deci-
sion, acting on behalf of the EU's greater good and from a concern
to maintain the march toward sustainable, long-run EU? On that
latter interpretation, a national constitutional court's decision
aims at saving the EU from the tendency of ideal-and-ideology
enterprises to be unable to correct course, in their zeal to fulfill
the grand political plan without deviation, and so march them-
selves off the cliff?
In the United States, though, any alleged judicial march toward
embracing some set of global norms in constitutional interpreta-
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tion (evidenced by a willingness to look to the practices of other
countries, in order to draw the U.S. back to the supposed global
center on important questions of values) appears quite dead. It
might return sometime and in some way, but not in its current
form. Nor is this a matter of U.S. legislators exercising sway over
the process by pressuring nominees to publicly repudiate the prac-
tice and what it signifies, or an executive branch understanding
the political need to select nominees to the bench with this politi-
cal caveat in mind. It appears for now that the Court as a whole
has retreated from some of the key tenets of universalism that
were once thought to undergird the practice.
The place to see this best is in the recent trajectory of universal-
ism in American courts defined (as likewise in the foreign citation
debate) by values issues and human rights is the Alien Tort Stat-
ute (ATS)2 4 . The ATS is the famous statute dating back to the
First Judiciary Act of 1789, providing a federal court remedy in
tort for suits by aliens for violations of the law of nations or a trea-
ty of the United States. Long dormant and forgotten, it was re-
vived by human rights advocates in the 1970s and 80s as a way of
bringing civil lawsuits against persons alleged to have participat-
ed in rights abuses, such as alleged torturers. The statute is "uni-
versal" in the sense that it permits suits by aliens against aliens
for alleged acts taking place entirely outside of the United States.
In that sense it was regarded as a national statute providing for
universal jurisdiction by U.S. courts, because it required none of
the traditional bases of international law for a national court to
assert jurisdiction, save for universal jurisdiction itself. Because
defendants rarely showed up to defend themselves, cases were
won by default, and district and circuit courts sometimes took the
opportunity to deliver ringing statements about human rights and
endorsement of the universalist view.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, the targets of ATS
suits had shifted from judgment-proof defendants to multinational
corporations with operations conducted through nationally sepa-
rated, legally distinct, limited-liability corporate entities. These
corporate entities had deep pockets (at least collectively), and alt-
hough in many cases U.S. -headquartered or chartered multina-
tionals were the defendants, in other cases, the corporate defend-
ants might be Canadian, or British, or Dutch, or Chinese. The
ATS required no ordinary jurisdictional connection to the U.S.-
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
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an exemplary universal jurisdiction statute in that regard-so a
Chinese multinational corporation might just as easily be sued as
an American one.
America's closest friends and allies-the UK, the Netherlands,
Canada, Australia, and others-had long expressed concern about
the apparently limitless (which is to say, universal) reach of the
ATS, even after the Supreme Court made (what turned out to be
ineffectual) moves to rein it in and tighten up its subject matter
requirements in the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.25 Their con-
cerns were partly about the ATS' universality-but universality in
the context of a statute that had the effect, whatever its original
intention, of establishing a regime of civil liability in international
law along with liability in international law beyond states that
reached to entities (such as corporations) rather than individuals
for criminal violations such as genocide or crimes against humani-
ty. But the Supreme Court took no action, even as lower court
cases endorsed all of these things as, in the first place, not contra-
ry to the literal language of the single-sentence ATS, and permit-
ted by the gradual accumulation of expanding lower court prece-
dent. The Court finally agreed to hear a case providing a clear
circuit split once the Second Circuit ruled, in sweeping language
in its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,26 that the
ATS did not apply to corporations because, under international
law, they were not entities subject to the "law of nations."
After hearing argument on the question of corporate liability
under the ATS, the Court took the surprising move of asking the
parties for additional briefing-setting the case for the following
Term-on the quite separate, and logically prior, question of
whether cases like Kiobel, which involved a foreign plaintiff, for-
eign defendant, and entirely foreign activity (so-called "foreign-
cubed" cases) had any business in federal courts at all.2 7 The
Court handed down its decision in April 2013,28 in a superficially
unanimous decision with a five-vote majority opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts and a concurrence in result only by Justice Breyer
that was endorsed by four justices.2 9
25. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
26. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
27. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (directing parties to file
supplemental briefs).
28. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
29. It should be noted that Justices Kennedy and Alito also filed concurrences.
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Another ideologically-driven, 5-4 decision from the Court? Sur-
prisingly not. For the purposes of understanding the end of the
constitutional moment of a genuinely globalized judiciary based
around convergence on universality, the majority and the concur-
rence shared the most important fundamentals. All nine Justices
appear today to share a view that the proper way to see ATS cas-
es-with judicial reasoning that draws upon and extends to differ-
ent kinds of cross-border disputes, as will almost certainly be seen
in the Court's decision in Bauman v. Daimler," to make a guess
based upon its oral argument-is not by reference to universality,
but instead by an analysis based upon traditional bases of juris-
diction (apart from universal jurisdiction itself) found in interna-
tional law. In effect, this turns the inquiry into one centered
around the grounds for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, in
which the jurisdictional question is not settled simply by reaching
to universal jurisdiction but instead requires a nexus under terri-
tory, nationality, and subject matter, as well as the related doc-
trines of comity, closeness and contacts, and so on.
This will leave plenty of room to reach different conclusions
about different cases, but at a minimum, the universality that al-
lowed Kiobel itself to proceed as a foreign-cubed case has been
banished. Chief Justice Roberts adopted a test based on the judi-
cially created "presumption against extraterritorial application" of
a statute (absent a clear intent of Congress)."' Justice Breyer
adopted a more holistic contacts-based approach that, he made
clear, would draw under it the serious human rights abuser who is
either present or (it seems likely as a reading of the concurrence)
has assets in the United States.3 2 And yet Justice Breyer's test
was framed, not in the universality terms-often sweeping, moral-
istic, and categorical-that generally characterized ATS opinions
of the 1980s onwards, but instead in traditional jurisdictional
terms: who would have sufficient contacts with the United States
to sustain jurisdiction?33
VIII. SOVEREIGNTY AFTER HEGEMONY
The U.S. Supreme Court's shared assumptions in Kiobel-
majority or concurrences-suggest a very different climate of rea-
30. 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (memorandum opinion granting certiorari).
31. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
32. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
33. Id.
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soning at the Court today.3 4 The earlier period was characterized
by a hesitant, mostly cautious, but still fundamentally approving,
embrace of universality through a globally shared set of judicial
values. Citation to opinions of foreign courts in constitutional ad-
judication is one modest marker of that.
Or maybe not: it's perfectly possible to argue the contrary and
say with a shrug that there's little reason to believe that foreign
citation ever had the importance that this essay, among many
other academic writings, has attributed to it. It was never a har-
binger of things to come within constitutional jurisprudence and
still less as some grand ideological vision of globalization. For
that matter, if it's a mistake to see the foreign citation dispute as
anything other than a minor squabble over what to put in largely
unnoticed string cites in an opinion, likewise pumping up Kiobel
into some replacement ideology is even less convincing. Moreover,
whereas the citation to foreign law in constitutional adjudication
is by way of justification for how to impose a norm otherwise un-
supported or only weakly supported internally in U.S. law on the
American people as a constitutional matter, ATS cases such as
Kiobel are the obverse, this normative force turned inside-out-
the imposition of American interpretations of supposedly univer-
sal norms externally, outwards on others in the world not other-
wise connected to the United States. The two are not necessarily
inconsistent.
The best way to see the decline of the foreign citation argument,
in other words, is exactly what Justice Breyer said-it's not big
deal, but if you think it's that big a deal, I won't bother to do it any
more, because (A New World Order, Chapter 2 notwithstanding)
there's no grand plan here. As for Justice Kennedy, even assum-
ing the transcendental apperception view suggested in this essay
is right, it's not as if he can't perform the same act of discernment
on purely domestic legal materials and reach exactly the same
result. In any case, to the extent that there's been an evolution
here, it has not been driven by any grand political, ideological, so-
ciological, economic, or psychological causes or explanations. The
simplest explanation-entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter neces-
34. For a discussion of what Kiobel and the ATS mean for "sovereignty after hegemo-
ny," see Kenneth Anderson, "Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort Statute's
Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat," CATO INSTITUTE (2013),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-
review/2013/9/anderson.pdf.
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sitate" and all that-is internal to the law in this case: the Justic-
es have learned the lesson that the comparative law scholars had
been saying for a long time: citation to foreign opinions is a lot
more complicated and subtle than it looks. It's not illegitimate as
such, but it requires a thick understanding of the legal ecology in
which that opinion dwells and has meaning. That's important,
says the skeptic, because it doesn't require recourse to the larger,
external issues that this essay has raised.
Skeptical take-down duly noted. But while accepting the force
of the internal comparativist argument, it still seems to me that
there's a larger, external agenda in play. It is partly ideological
and partly political; more precisely, it is an ideological affinity
blocked by a political reality. The ideological affinity is simply the
tug and pull of liberal internationalism as global governance upon
several of the Justices. Though never much more, in my estima-
tion, for any of the Justices on the Court so inclined than a sensi-
bility of cosmopolitanism, even so, it is far from irrelevant in the
fundamental jurisprudential approach to universal normative
claims. It is some evidence as to whether one's orientation-which
is to say, sensibility-in constitutional adjudication looks funda-
mentally to a theory of popular sovereignty (a theory, of course,
that has always accepted a role for counter-majoritarian institu-
tions such as an independent judiciary so long as constrained by
the fundamental terms of democratic constitutionalism). Or
whether, instead, it senses legitimacy in drawing into constitu-
tional interpretation the general will, the universal will, by com-
parison to which the people's will is barely relevant and certainly
not a source of legitimacy.
The politics that have blocked this path are, in a word: Chila.
China's rise has signaled a resurgence of sovereignty-sovereignty
with a very different, very old meaning-that renders the dream
of a rising liberal internationalism as global governance just
that-a dream. It was still possible to hold that dream during the
constitutional moment that has just passed; I would have objected
to its normative character, but today, it is simply not descriptively
plausible, at least not without some heroic assumptions about pol-
itics and the normative pull of law. Yet why, someone will ask, is
sovereignty any greater a bar today than it was any time before?
It's a good, brutal question and the answer is equally brutal.
The dream of universal human rights, liberal internationalism,
35. "Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity."
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and global governance was only possible, it turns out, when it
dwells under the sheltering sky of American hegemony. A loose
and undemanding American hegemony that doesn't much care
even if those who benefit from America's rough order and security
noisily reject the terms of hegemony in favor of liberal interna-
tionalism and demand that America transfer the instruments of
its hegemony over to the international community.3 6 Or at least
be willing to act as an instrument of the international community,
rather than as the hegemon acting in its own interest (which is,
nota bene, why the hegemon is trusted in things that truly count
rather than the international community's collective-action-
failure-prone "collective security") but which provides significant
global public goods as well, such as the security and freedom of the
high seas and the airspace above it. I
This is a complicated account, because it requires an explana-
tion of hegemony and its relationship to the international commu-
nity, and the relationship of hegemony to claims of universal val-
ues. But the conclusion is the same: the dreams of global govern-
ance in a liberal internationalist world, universal values and uni-
versal human rights, are possible only under a broadly liberal
democratic hegemon. And it was only under that hegemony that
both the dream of an emerging "global legal order" or, for that
matter, the American ATS or other states' mechanisms of univer-
sal jurisdiction, were ever possible.
But American hegemony is seemingly under pressure and in re-
treat. Nowhere so much as in the eastern Pacific, where Ameri-
ca's security commitment and with it, the perception that a belli-
cose shift of the status quo would meet with a vigorous American
military response, are both in some doubt. Whether American
hegemonic security in the Pacific is actually in doubt, I do not
know-but it is clear that American allies and China all harbor
questions about it. Take the decline of American hegemony by
assumption, however. Does it seem possible that this really has
no implications for the possibility and nature of international legal
relations, through such jurisdictional mechanisms as the ATS or
(fondly held) background assumptions about the rise of liberal in-
ternationalism and global governance?
It's hard to imagine that the international political perception of
hegemony (which is never a matter of mere power alone, but in-
stead of a broad, rough legitimacy that transforms the use of pow-
36. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 11.
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er into authority) does not impact how governments and courts see
the claims of normative universalism and universal values. The
claims of universalism might start to seem an unaffordable, un-
sustainable sentimentalism: do the United States government, the
Obama Administration, and the administrations that come after
really think it will be politically prudent to allow Chinese corpora-
tions to be sued in American courts by non-Americans for activi-
ties, none of which take place in America? It is a mistake to at-
tribute political motives of this kind to Justices of the Court in a
single case, at least not without clear evidence of it. Yet a reason-
ably clear general incentive for both government and the judiciary
might predict an overall trend toward replacing expanding con-
cepts of universal jurisdiction with much more limited, sovereign-
ty-linked tests found in traditional bases of extraterritorial juris-
diction-whether Kiobel, or Daimler, or other cases of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction.
Yet, by the same token, the decline of universalism makes glob-
al governance claims that depend upon giving up important as-
pects of sovereignty less attractive because there is no good reason
to think they will be reciprocated by anyone who matters. And in
any case, even such seemingly unimportant activities by the judi-
ciary-citing foreign law or un-assented international law in con-
stitutional cases-is not likely to seem attractive in a world in
which the rising sovereigns, the new powers or great powers, are
more likely to be, if not themselves illiberal authoritarians, less
impressed with arguments that promoting liberal democracy is a
priority of the new world order. That was a reality of the interna-
tional community that could long be masked-the totality of the
international community could be reduced to the views of the
"good guys," the Nordics or Costa Rica or New Zealand, while the
much more dicey moral reality of the world could be suppressed.
But the actual nature of the "international community" can't be
suppressed in a world in which American hegemony is in serious
retreat and China's version of illiberal, undemocratic sovereignty,
not liberal internationalism, is ascendant and admired as a path
to economic success that eschews liberal democracy as a snare and
a trap and simply unnecessary.
IX. CONCLUSION
The question for the future, then, is whether any member of the
U.S. Supreme Court is going to think it a prudent or attractive
exercise to cite to foreign courts, or to international law to which
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the U.S. has not assented, in cases interpreting its own Constitu-
tion, as a way of underscoring the moral authority of the interna-
tional community in channeling universal values-in a world in
which the international community takes on much more of the
character of China than Sweden. And, in the absence of the re-
straining weight of the world's security and economic hegemon, an
international community whose members embrace exercises of
sovereignty that owe little to liberal internationalism and its form
of global governance.
It's possible that citation or deeper forms of judicial integra-
tion-in case law or common interpretations-will take hold as a
form of solidarity among liberal democracies that sense the pres-
sures coming at them from a new world order that takes its cue
from sovereignty unconstrained by liberalism. Indeed, I believe
something like this might well take place among societies with
pre-existing affinities: Britain, Canada, Australia, or New Zea-
land, for example; or within the EU as part of its ongoing process
of integration; or even among liberal democratic Latin American
states (perhaps as they address issues such as labor rights or en-
vironmental issues arising from foreign investment, or seek to re-
vise increasingly controversial Bilateral Investment Treaty re-
gimes). Perhaps even the United States would join in; but wheth-
er from a position of strength (as the hegemon citing the courts of
weaker states in support of its liberal democratic struggles) or
weakness (as the declining hegemon seeking strength in numbers)
is an open question.
With one important exception-Justice Kennedy's reliance upon
an un-ratified treaty for a deeply values-laden proposition on hu-
man rights3 7-actual citations to foreign law in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence date have been little more than adornments-little
more than what Justice Breyer said they were. The concern
among critics was always to nip it in the bud before it could grow
into something widely grounded in judicial opinions at all levels of
courts as a basis for appealing to international human rights law
as a ground for imposing supposedly universal claims on Ameri-
cans in an end-run around domestic sovereign practice. It's easy
to scoff, now that the practice has largely been stopped in its
tracks, that it never was more than what it was; like the ATS and
other judicial mechanisms that reach to open-ended international
37. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622 (2005).
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law moralizing, once embedded, they have no natural stopping
points.
This is an observation that Mary Ann Glendon has emphasized
many times in her writing: rights-talk is self-inflating. It's one of
the reasons why Professor Glendon's work, even dating back twen-
ty or more years, bears re-reading. The political feedback process-
es that tend to put the brakes on the one-way ratchet of rights-
talk in U.S. domestic law are much less able to do so when the
claims come from vague declarations of universal human rights
law, the formulation and claims to authority of which lie in the
hands of constituencies largely outside the U.S. political process.
In a world in which the persistence of American hegemony is in
genuine question, foreign law citation in constitutional adjudica-
tion is part of a cluster of extraterritorial jurisdiction practices
that are likely to be revisited if the international political envi-
ronment continues to shift away from American power. Univer-
salist versions of the ATS or universal jurisdiction claimed by na-
tional courts in an expanding way are likely to contract-as they
already are. There are excellent internal legal explanations for
this, but the external political factors surely play some kind of
role. It's always possible that predictions like this come a cropper,
of course. But absent some kind of serious resurgence of American
hegemony in a way that is not just about power, with America's
security and economic power underwriting the fundamental condi-
tions of stability (particularly in the Pacific), supporting players
such as the judiciary must eventually follow the decline.
In that case, universal jurisdiction by national courts or reach-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction doctrines are likely to contract
over time, at least in part because their universalist claims de-
pend not upon universality but upon hegemony. In a world of
American hegemony in retreat, however, what's rising is not a
global community of shared values, but instead sovereigns far less
constrained by U.S. power and far less attached to liberal values.
Judiciaries of the diminished powers are less likely, it seems to
me, to embrace universalist or reaching extraterritorial claims
because they can't back them up and because the political branch-
es of those governments see a sharp increase in political risks.
Sustained American hegemony would be better. The proudly
universal claims of values and rights proffered by the "good guys"
of the international community have always depended(far more
than many might want to admit) on a hegemonic order that al-
lowed them to portray their claims as universal rather than simp-
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ly as the overlapping values of the hegemon. Claims of universal
human rights owe far less to America paying a decent respect to
the opinions of mankind-at least if that is supposed to mean em-
bracing the norms and authority of the international community
as global governance-than America's long-run exercise of global
power in as decent a way as would yet be effective.38
38. THOMAS BERGER, ARTHUR REx: A LEGENDARY NOVEL 484 (1978).
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